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O

bjectivity is a fundamental value in the practice of science
and is required to optimally assess one’s own research findings, others’ findings, and the merits of others’ abilities and ideas
(1). For example, when scientists evaluate data collected on a
potentially controversial topic (such as climate change), they strive
to set aside their own belief systems and instead focus solely on the
strength of the data and conclusions warranted. Similarly, when
scientists evaluate a resume for a laboratory-manager position or
assess the importance of a conference submission, the gender of
the applicant or author should be immaterial. If they are truly
objective, scientists should focus only on the relevant criteria of
applicant qualifications or research merit.
However, despite rigorous training in the objective evaluation of
information and resultant values (2), people working and learning
within the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) community are still prone to the same subtle biases that
subvert objectivity and distort accurate perceptions of scientific
evidence by the general public (3, 4). We focus here on the
robust gender biases documented repeatedly within the psychological literature (5–7). Some within the STEM community have turned
to these methods and ideas as an explanation for the consistent
underrepresentation of women in STEM fields (8, 9) and the undervaluation of these women and their work. Specifically, many
scientists have systemically documented and reported (including in
PNAS) a gender bias against women—or favoring men—in STEM
contexts (10–17), including hiring decisions for a laboratory-manager
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1510649112

position (10) and selection for a mathematical task (11), evaluations
of conference abstracts (12), research citations (13), symposiaspeaker invitations (14), postdoctoral employment (15), and tenure
decisions (16). For example, Moss-Racusin et al. (10) conducted an
experiment in which university science professors received the same
application for a laboratory-manager position, either associated with
a male or female name through random assignment. The results
demonstrated that the science professors—regardless of their
gender—evaluated the applicant more favorably if the applicant
had a man’s name compared to a woman’s name. These findings
mirror past results in which men and women psychology faculty
participants evaluated an application from a faculty candidate
with a woman’s name less favorably than the identical application
with a man’s name (17). As another example, Knobloch-Westerwick
et al. (12) found that graduate students evaluate science-related
conference abstracts more positively when attributed to a male relative to a female author, particularly in male-gender-typed science
fields. These biases are frequently unintentional (18–20), exhibited
even by individuals who greatly value fairness and view themselves as
objective (21). Indeed, gender biases often result from unconscious
processes (22, 23) or manifest so subtly that they escape notice (24).
However unintentional or subtle, systematic gender bias favoring male scientists and their work could significantly hinder scientific progress and communication (12). In fact, the evidence for
a gender bias in STEM suggests that our scientific community is
not living up to its potential, because homogenous workforces
(including the academic workplace) can deplete the creativity,
discovery, and satisfaction of workers, faculty, and students (25–
27). STEM fields are fairly homogeneously male; at 4-y US colleges, for example, an average of 71% of STEM faculty are men
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Scientists are trained to evaluate and interpret evidence without
bias or subjectivity. Thus, growing evidence revealing a gender
bias against women—or favoring men—within science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) settings is provocative
and raises questions about the extent to which gender bias may
contribute to women’s underrepresentation within STEM fields.
To the extent that research illustrating gender bias in STEM is
viewed as convincing, the culture of science can begin to address
the bias. However, are men and women equally receptive to this
type of experimental evidence? This question was tested with
three randomized, double-blind experiments—two involving samples from the general public (n = 205 and 303, respectively) and
one involving a sample of university STEM and non-STEM faculty
(n = 205). In all experiments, participants read an actual journal
abstract reporting gender bias in a STEM context (or an altered
abstract reporting no gender bias in experiment 3) and evaluated
the overall quality of the research. Results across experiments
showed that men evaluate the gender-bias research less favorably
than women, and, of concern, this gender difference was especially prominent among STEM faculty (experiment 2). These results
suggest a relative reluctance among men, especially faculty men
within STEM, to accept evidence of gender biases in STEM. This
finding is problematic because broadening the participation of underrepresented people in STEM, including women, necessarily requires a widespread willingness (particularly by those in the
majority) to acknowledge that bias exists before transformation
is possible.

(28). For these reasons, there is a growing call for broadening the
participation of women (and other underrepresented groups) in
STEM fields. For instance, the National Science Foundation (NSF)
promoted inclusiveness as a core value in its 2014–18 strategic plan,
continues to fund ADVANCE Institutional Transformation grants
to broaden the participation of women faculty in STEM, and has
created a directorate charged with broadening the participation of
all underrepresented people within STEM. Similarly, the National
Institutes of Health called for reducing subtle biases and broadening participation in STEM fields (29) and issued at least three
large new requests for proposals to help accomplish this goal (30).
Indeed, there are growing numbers of research studies, calls to
action, strategic plans, and even resources to systematically
document, understand, and hopefully ameliorate gender biases
within STEM to create a thriving, diverse, and equitable scientific
community (31–34). However, are people generally (e.g., taxpayers, voters, government officials, etc.) and STEM practitioners
in particular “buying” the mounting evidence of these gender
biases within the STEM community? Currently, to our knowledge,
there is no experimental research examining how receptive or
biased various individuals within the STEM and public communities are to research demonstrating gender bias that undermines
women’s participation within STEM. Thus, to address this question, our experimental research investigates potentially biased
evaluations among the general public and STEM practitioners of
evidence demonstrating gender biases against women/favoring men
within STEM fields.
Of course, to ameliorate gender bias within STEM fields, it
is not sufficient to simply herald findings demonstrating that
STEM practitioners exhibit these biases. Indeed, there may well
be another layer of bias such that men evaluate findings such
as those reported by Moss-Racusin et al. (10) and KnoblochWesterwick et al. (12) less favorably than women. In fact, a recent (nonexperimental) analysis of naturally occurring online
comments written by readers of popular press articles covering
the research of Moss-Racusin et al. (10) suggests that men were
more likely than women to demonstrate negative reactions to
experimental evidence of gender bias (35). Further, several lines
of theorizing suggest that men may evaluate such research as
less meritorious than would women (24, 36–42). Among these
theories, Social Identity Theory (36–38) and related perspectives
(39) posit that people are motivated to perceive their group favorably and defend that perception against threat, and that
people within privileged groups often seek to retain and justify
their privileged status (39). Men clearly hold an advantageous
position within the sciences, because they represent the vast
majority of STEM university faculty at all ranks, earn higher
salaries controlling for rank and related factors (43), and on
average receive more federal grant funding to support their research than their comparable women colleagues (44, 45). Indeed,
growing evidence reveals an often invisible advantage for men,
stemming in part from inequities against women in STEM,
which can threaten that advantage (10, 12, 46, 47). That is, men
might find the results reported by Moss-Racusin et al. (10)
threatening, because remedying the gender bias in STEM fields
could translate into favoring women over men, especially if one
takes a zero-sum-gain perspective (47). Therefore, relative to
women, men may devalue such evidence in an unintentional
implicit effort (18–20) to retain their status as the majority group
in STEM fields. However, some men might perceive research
that exposes gender bias in STEM as more threatening than
other men. According to Social identity Theory, individuals
perceive greater threat toward their group (and defend against
it) when they are highly committed to that group (37, 38). Thus,
men within STEM fields (e.g., physics professors) may feel more
threated by the research of Moss-Racusin et al. (10) than men
within non-STEM fields (e.g., English professors), assuming they
are more committed to STEM fields and men’s status therein.
13202 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1510649112

Thus, men overall relative to women are likely to devalue research demonstrating bias against women in STEM, but this
difference may be prominent among individuals within (and
committed to) STEM fields, and weaker to nonexistent among
individuals within non-STEM fields.
Beyond Social Identity Theory, other frameworks could predict a difference between men’s and women’s evaluation of research demonstrating bias against women in STEM, and, in fact,
this difference might result from multiple factors. For instance,
the predicted gender difference may also result from a confirmation bias such that people favorably evaluate information
that is consistent with their beliefs, but unfavorably evaluate
information that is inconsistent with their beliefs (48). A classic
empirical example of confirmation bias showed that peer-reviewers
were less favorable toward an essentially identical research manuscript when it was doctored to report results inconsistent with the
reviewers’ preferred theoretical viewpoint, but more favorable
when it was doctored to report results consistent with the reviewers’ preferred theoretical viewpoint (49). Add to this finding
that there is compelling evidence that women faculty are more
likely to view gender bias as a problem within their current working
academic context (40), and it is possible that women may evaluate
research demonstrating a gender bias (belief consistent) more favorably than men, but evaluate research demonstrating no gender
bias (belief inconsistent) less favorably than men.
Current Research
We report three experiments designed to provide, to our knowledge, the first test for gender differences in the evaluation of scientific evidence demonstrating that individuals are biased against
women within STEM contexts. In each experiment, men and
women participants read via an online survey instrument an actual
article abstract from a peer-reviewed scientific journal, accompanied by the date and title of the publication (see Materials and
Methods for more details). Participants then evaluated their
agreement with the authors’ interpretation of the results, the importance of the research, and how well-written and favorable they
found the quality of the abstract. These ratings were highly associated with one another and were averaged to create a measure of
participants’ overall evaluation of the abstract (for further details,
see SI Materials and Methods, Dependent Variables). Globally, we
predicted that male relative to female participants would evaluate
the abstract less favorably when the abstract reported a gender
bias against women in STEM (hypothesis A; experiments 1–3),
and that this difference would be more prominent among participants in STEM (vs. non-STEM) fields, to whom a gender bias in
STEM is most germane (hypothesis B; experiment 2). Further, we
predicted that this gender difference would manifest for abstracts
that reported a gender bias in STEM, but would reverse for
abstracts that reported no gender bias in STEM (hypothesis C;
experiment 3).
All experiments included 2 or more factors (some for exploratory
purposes in Experiments 1 and 2; see SI Materials and Methods for
more details), and thus we tested all hypotheses using betweengroups factorial analyses of variance. Further, we calculated
Cohen’s d for each experiment to provide an index of strength for
the predicted difference between men and women participants
and to account for the unequal sample sizes between the genders.
As per convention (50), effect sizes can range from small (d =
0.20), to medium (d = 0.50), to large (d = 0.80).
The first two experiments tested for participant-gender differences in the evaluation of the actual abstract written by MossRacusin et al. (10). As discussed above, Moss-Racusin et al. (10)
produced experimental evidence that STEM faculty of both genders demonstrate a significant bias against an identical applicant
with a female vs. male name. Although this gender bias was empirically demonstrated with a national sample, we predicted that
men would be less receptive to these (and related) findings, and
Handley et al.

Results
Experiments 1 and 2. Results from our experiment 1 supported

hypothesis A, revealing a main effect of participant gender [F(1,
197) = 9.85, P = 0.002, η2partial = 0.048], such that men (M =
4.25, SD = 0.91, n = 146) evaluated the research less favorably
than women (M = 4.66, SD = 0.93, n = 59) in a general sample.
Further, this effect was of moderate size (d = 0.45).
Results from our experiment 2 also supported hypothesis A,
revealing a main effect of participant gender [F(1, 174) = 6.08,
P = 0.015, η2partial = 0.034], such that male faculty evaluated the
research less favorably (M = 4.21, SD = 1.05) than female faculty
(M = 4.65, SD = 1.19; d = 0.397 [similar to experiment 1]). Thus,
overall, experiments 1 and 2 provide converging evidence from
multiple participant populations that men are less receptive than
women—and by the same token, that women are more receptive
than men—to experimental evidence of gender bias in STEM.
Importantly, results from experiment 2 further reveal that this
effect was qualified by a significant interaction between participant gender and field of study [F(1, 174) = 5.19, P = 0.024,
η2partial = 0.03]. This interaction supported hypothesis B, because
simple-effect tests confirmed that male faculty evaluated the
research less favorably (M = 4.02, SD = 0.988, n = 66) than female faculty (M = 4.80, SD = 1.14, n = 38) in STEM fields
[F(1, 174) = 11.94, P < 0.001], whereas male (M = 4.55, SD =
1.09, n = 37) and female (M = 4.54, SD = 1.23, n = 49) faculty
reported comparable evaluations in non-STEM fields (F < 1).
Further, the effect size for the observed gender difference was
large within STEM departments (d = 0.74). Looking at this interaction another way, simple-effect tests demonstrated that men
evaluated the research more negatively if they were in STEM
than non-STEM departments [F(1, 174) = 4.19, P = 0.042],
whereas the opposite trend was not statistically significant among
female faculty [F(1, 174) = 1.45, P = 0.23]. Thus, it seems that
men in STEM displayed harsher judgments of Moss-Racusin
et al.’s (10) research, not that women in STEM exhibited more
positive evaluations of it. The analysis revealed one other significant interaction that did not involve faculty gender (for further details, see SI Additional Analyses, Experiment 2). No other
main effects or interactions reached significance (all other F <
2.07; P > 0.15). Finally, additional measures collected within a
faculty survey (SI Materials and Methods, Dependent Variables)
and analyses thereof provide suggestive evidence for a threat
mechanism behind the effects (for the analyses and discussion,
see SI Additional Analyses, Experiment 2).
Experiment 3. We predicted that, compared with women, men
would be prone to more negative evaluations of research that
demonstrates a gender bias against women (and favors men) in
STEM, not just the specific research reported by Moss-Racusin
et al. (10). Further, we predicted that, compared with men,
women would be prone to more negative evaluations of research
that demonstrates no gender bias against women in STEM.
Thus, the gender effect seen in experiments 1 and 2 should
replicate for a different abstract that also reports a gender bias,
but reverse for an abstract that demonstrates no gender bias.
Testing these predictions, we randomly assigned new participants
to read either the original abstract published by KnoblochWesterwick et al. (12) which reported a gender bias against
Handley et al.

women’s (relative to men’s) scientific conference submissions, or
a version slightly altered to report no gender bias. These participants were recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (n = 303). Results indicated only a significant interaction
between participant gender and abstract version [F(1, 299) =
4.00, P = 0.046, η2partial = 0.013] (all other F < 1). Although no
simple-effect tests were significant (all F < 2.69, P > 0.10), together, these results support the overall pattern predicted by
hypothesis C, such that that men evaluated the original (genderbias exists) abstract less favorably (M = 3.65, SD = 1.03, n = 78)
than did women (M = 3.86, SD = 1.05, n = 74; d = 0.20), whereas
men evaluated the modified (no gender-bias exists) abstract
more favorably (M = 3.83, SD = 0.92, n = 84) than did women
(M = 3.59, SD = 0.86, n = 67; d = 0.27).
Discussion
There is now copious evidence that women are disadvantaged in
STEM fields (51–53) and that this disadvantage may relate to
gender stereotypes (11) and consequent biases against women
(or favoring men) traversing the STEM pipeline (10–17). Of
course, people should not passively accept such evidence, even if
it appears in preeminent peer-reviewed journals (e.g., Science,
PNAS, or Nature)—suggesting the quality of the research was
sound. Ideally, especially within the STEM community, people
should evaluate as objectively as possible the research producing
such evidence, the resulting quality of the evidence, and the interpretation of that evidence.
However, the evidence from our three straightforward experiments indicates than men evaluate research that demonstrates
bias against women in STEM less favorably than do women—or,
that women evaluate it more favorably. Specifically, male relative
to female participants (including university faculty) in experiments 1 and 2 assessed the quality of the research by MossRacusin et al. (10)—as presented simply through their actual
abstract—as being lower. In addition, perhaps of greatest concern, this gender difference and accompanying effect size was
large among faculty working within STEM fields (50) and nonexistent among faculty from non-STEM fields (experiment 2).
Further, the overall gender difference observed in the first two
experiments was replicated among participants in experiment 3
who read the true abstract of Knobloch-Westerwick et al. (12),
which also reported a gender bias in STEM. However, this
gender difference was reversed among participants who read an
altered version purporting no gender bias in STEM.
The results from this third experiment are important for at least
three reasons. First, they indicate that men relative to women do
not uniquely disfavor the research of Moss-Racusin et al. (10), but
research that reports a gender bias hindering women in STEM.
Second, these results suggest that men do not generally evaluate
research more harshly than women, as it might seem from the first
two experiments (but see the results from non-STEM faculty in
experiment 2). Rather, relative to women, men actually favor research suggesting there is no gender bias in STEM. Finally, the
results indicate that individuals are likely to demonstrate a gender
bias toward research pertaining to the mere topic of gender bias in
STEM; men seem to disfavor (and women favor) research demonstrating a gender bias, but women seem to disfavor (and men
favor) research demonstrating no gender bias. Of course, given
that we cannot have a gender-free control condition, it is important to note that these biases are relative to the other gender; we
cannot conclude that one gender is more biased than the other,
just that individuals’ judgments of research regarding gender bias
in STEM is biased by their gender.
Critically, across three experiments, we uncovered a gender difference in the way people from the general public and STEM
faculty evaluate the quality of research that demonstrates women’s
documented disadvantage in STEM fields: Men think the research
is of lower quality, whereas women think the research is of higher
PNAS | October 27, 2015 | vol. 112 | no. 43 | 13203
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women more receptive. Our first experiment involved a general
sample of US adults (n = 205) recruited online through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. Our second experiment involved a sample of
professors (n = 205) from all STEM and non-STEM departments
at a research-intensive university, allowing us to test whether the
predicted gender difference in abstract evaluations is larger among
individuals within STEM fields of study. A third experiment replicated the first two with a different abstract and is discussed in
more detail below.

quality. Why does this gender difference matter? For one, there are
significant implications for the dissemination and impact of meritorious previous, current, and future research on gender bias in
STEM fields. Foremost, our research suggests that men will
relatively disfavor—and women will relatively favor—research
demonstrating this bias. Given that men dominate STEM fields
throughout industry and academia, scholars whose program of
research focuses on demonstrating gender bias in STEM settings
might experience undue challenges for publication, have lower
chances of publication in top-tier outlets, experience greater challenges in receiving tenure, and overall have lower-than-warranted
impact on the thinking, research, and practice of those in STEM
fields. Such possibilities are highly problematic and call for additional research evaluating biased reactions to scientific evidence
demonstrating gender and/or racial biases within STEM.
Second, because men represent the majority of individuals in
STEM fields and yet are less likely than women to acknowledge
biases against women in STEM, it may be challenging to fully
embrace the numerous calls to broaden the participation of
women and minorities in STEM. How can we successfully broaden
the participation of women in STEM when the very research
underscoring the need for this initiative is less valued by the majority group who dominate and maintain the culture of STEM?
Intensifying the challenge, men hold an advantageous position in
STEM fields and may feel threatened by research and efforts to
“level the playing field” for women. Similarly, people often unintentionally exhibit in-group favoritism (54), wherein individuals
engage in behaviors and allocate resources in ways that benefit
members of their group (e.g., men unintentionally conferring advantage to other men).
Fortunately, there are current efforts in place to meet these
challenges. For example, “Project Implicit” (https://implicit.
harvard.edu/implicit/) provides workshops and talks to reveal
the subtlety and implicitness of gender bias and considers how to
foster a broader recognition of these biases and address them.
Further, NSF funds ADVANCE-Institutional Transformation
grants to specifically facilitate the increased participation of women
in STEM and help transform academic cultures to foster equality
and inclusivity. Shields et al. (55) created a “WAGES” game and
accompanying discussion platform that effectively highlights male
privilege and advantage among STEM faculty and helps reduce
reactance to acknowledging this advantage (56). Finally, MossRacusin et al. have developed an evidence-based framework for
creating, evaluating, and implementing diversity interventions
designed to increase awareness of and reduce bias across STEM
fields (31). Initial evidence reveals promising results for interventions
adhering to these guidelines (31). These efforts, along with others
that can help individuals actually acknowledge evidence demonstrating gender bias in STEM, are critical in bringing about change
and increasing the participation of women in STEM.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with any research, ours is met with limitations. First, we did
not directly test the potential mechanisms behind the reported
gender effect. However, even before we understand exactly why
men are less favorable than women toward research demonstrating a gender bias in STEM, we suggest that is important for
the STEM community to know that this phenomenon exists.
However, we uncovered evidence in experiment 2 suggesting that
men in STEM found the abstract of Moss-Racusin et al. (10)
threatening (SI Additional Analyses, Experiment 2), which may be
one possible explanation for the results (37). In the future, researchers could test this possibility by including a direct measure
of how threatening people find the implications of various research results and multiple measures of social identity. It is also
worth investigating in future research whether the confirmation
bias (48, 49) contributes to the reported gender effect by measuring people’s beliefs about gender bias in STEM before
13204 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1510649112

reading research demonstrating that bias. We hope our findings
will spark future research thoroughly investigating the mechanisms
underscoring this effect. Second, we investigated individuals’
evaluations of two abstracts reporting gender bias in STEM,
specifically within the contexts of evaluating a laboratory-manager
application and conference abstracts. It is worthwhile to investigate whether this bias furthermore generalizes to evaluations of
research that demonstrates gender bias in other STEM contexts,
such as disparities in funding, publication rates, faculty and postdoctoral applicants, talk invitations, tenure decisions, and so forth.
Theoretically, however, there is reason to predict that gender
biases toward such research would replicate our current findings.
In fact, because these contexts suggest a bias against (or in favor
of) one’s direct peers and colleagues, it seems likely that genderbiased evaluations of this research would be even more prominent.
For instance, STEM faculty might find threatening the possibility
that they are biased regarding the quality of research from their
female colleagues and prefer (likely implicitly) to find fault with
the research rather than face that possibility.
Third, we investigated individuals’ assessment of research
quality after they read only an abstract. We chose an abstract as a
reasonable basis for assessment because abstracts present key
methods and findings, are indexed and available for free, and are
often what people read to determine whether or not they will read
the full article. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the gender bias
we uncovered is a short-lived reaction. Perhaps the bias would
shrink or disappear after reading the full article or a longer synopsis of the research. However, there is ample reason to predict
that the bias will actually strengthen as people receive greater
amounts of information, because they will (unintentionally) process that information based on initial impressions and per their
motivation to arrive at a particular conclusion (42, 48, 49). However, we encourage future research into this issue.
As a final point on limitations, our experiments took place on
an Internet platform, either at the end of a faculty survey that
offered US$5 or as a short 10-min experiment paying $0.25. Thus,
it is possible that our participants were not highly motivated to
think about the abstract and thus simply based their quality assessments on “gut reactions” resulting in part from unconscious
biases. Perhaps our findings would not hold among highly motivated participants whose assessments might have actual bearing on
the publication of the research described in the abstract (e.g., peer
reviewers). This hypothesis is certainly a possibility that warrants
future exploration. However, we note that greater motivation does
not always result in greater objectivity. In fact, biases can influence
people’s judgments even more so when they are motivated to be
accurate, particularly if they do not notice that their thought
process is biased (21, 42).
Further research might also explore why our first two experiments did not replicate previous research demonstrating an
overall bias favoring the research of men above women in STEM
(SI Additional Analyses). In particular, Knobloch-Westerwick
et al. (12) found that graduate students evaluate science-related
conference abstracts more positively when attributed to a male
(relative to female) author, particularly in male-gender-typed
fields. However, we did not find that participants in experiment 1
and 2 favored the abstract written by Moss-Racusin et al. (10) more
if they thought it was written by a man vs. a women. It is possible
that participants in our first two experiments found the topic of
gender bias within STEM “feminine,” or perhaps only somewhat
“scientific,” thus decreasing the bias toward the author’s gender.
Future research might reveal that participants’ perception of gender-bias research plays an important role in producing biases
against women—and favoring men—who conduct such research.
Conclusion
Failures in objectivity are problematic to specific research projects,
science generally, and receptivity to discovery. However, objectivity
Handley et al.

Materials and Methods
Participants. In experiments 1 and 3, participation was solicited from workers
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online job site, who could view our employment opportunity listed alongside other opportunities. In experiment 1, a
total of 205 individuals (146 men and 59 women) from the United States
who were 18 y of age or older (M = 30.13; range = 18–66) opted to participate in the experiment and provided usable data (for more details, see SI
Materials and Methods, Participants and Recruitment for Experiments 1 and 3).
In experiment 3, a total of 303 individuals (162 men and 141 women) from the
United States who were 18 y of age or older (M = 34.22; range = 18–79) opted
to participate in the experiment and provided usable data. All participants
engaged in the ∼10-min experiment in exchange for $0.25.
In experiment 2, participation was first solicited from all tenure-track
faculty at a research-intensive American university via an email from their
university provost encouraging participation in a larger baseline faculty climate
survey. The survey and experiment were conducted on an Internet platform,
during which time 506 tenure-track faculty from this university received the
email invitation to participate. A total of 268 of these faculty participated in the
survey, and 205 of these faculty further elected to participate in our experiment
at the end of the survey. The resulting sample included faculty from all departments at the university, from STEM departments (n = 116) and non-STEM
departments (n = 89; for more details, see SI Materials and Methods, Participants
and Recruitment for Experiment 2). All participants received a $5 coupon for a
local coffee shop and, if they elected, were entered into a raffle for 1 of 50
possible $50US gift certificates for the campus bookstore.

the experiment using a personal or work computer and received experiment
materials, provided informed consent, and provided responses through
surveymonkey.com.
Participants in experiments 1 and 2 were first instructed to read the actual
abstract from the Moss-Racusin et al. (10) paper, which was provided in full
on a single screen. The abstract was accompanied by that paper’s actual title,
publication date, volume and issue number, first author’s full name, keywords, and a fictitious DOI. Further, participants were randomly assigned to
receive a version of the abstract that either identified the first authors’ first
name as “Karen” or “Brian,” which previous research indicates are equally
likable and common names in the United States (58). Independent from this
manipulation, participants received a version of the abstract that identified
the author as affiliated with either Yale University (Moss-Racusin’s true affiliation at the time of the publication) or Iowa State University. After
reading the abstract and affiliated information, participants were asked to
provide ratings on several scales (adapted from scales commonly used to
gauge attitude change and evaluations of persuasive materials) assessing the
quality of the abstract and the research provided therein (for details, see SI
Materials and Methods, Dependent Variables). Participants also provided demographic information, including their gender. Participants’ responses were
anonymous, but in experiment 2 their status as a STEM or non-STEM faculty
member was identifiable using specialized codes. Overall, the research design
allowed us to analyze participants’ quality assessments of the Moss-Racusin
et al. (10) research as a function of participant gender, author gender, author
affiliation, and participants’ STEM affiliation (experiment 2 only).
Participants in experiment 3 completed a similar procedure, with some key
differences. First, participants were randomly assigned to read either the
original version of the abstract by Knobloch-Westerwick et al. (12), which
reported a gender bias, or a version slightly altered to report no gender
differences. Second, the abstract was not accompanied by the author’s name
or affiliation (as was done in experiments 1 and 2). Otherwise, the procedures and dependent measures for this experiment are identical to those
used in the previous experiments. This research design allowed us to analyze
participants’ quality assessments of the research by Knobloch-Westerwick
et al. (10) as a function of participant gender and abstract version (reporting
gender bias or no gender bias).

Procedure. All procedures were approved by the Montana State University
institutional review board. The three experiments were approximately
identical, although the experiment stood alone in experiments 1 and 3 and
followed a faculty climate survey in experiment 2. All participants completed
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